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Hybrid Categories as Political Devices: The Case of Impact Investing in Frontier 
Markets 
 
                                                     ABSTRACT 
  
Much of the current literature on category construction and maintenance has focused 
primarily on the disciplining effect of audiences that evaluate for conformity.  This literature 
often characterizes categories as benign organizing devices that bring order to social life. 
However, categories are also contentious political and cultural productions. This is especially 
so when the categories are hybrid. Employing a qualitative case study of an impact investing 
organization operating in Sub Saharan Africa, we illustrate how the construction and 
maintenance of hybrid categories can have potentially advantageous effects for certain actors 
by shaping the architecture of knowledge and transferring legitimacy to otherwise illegitimate 
actors or nascent practices. The findings of this study highlight how some hybrid categories 
can be used to create and maintain unequal relations of power.  
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Hybrid Categories as Political Devices: The Case of Impact Investing in Frontier 
Markets 
Questions about categories have been at the foundation of social science for over a 
century. Sociologists, cultural anthropologists, economists and cognitive psychologists, 
amongst others, have long been concerned with the nature of categories: where they come 
from, how they are created and how they spread. Although classification systems have been 
acknowledged as a socially constructed process (Zhao, 2005; Glynn and Navis, 2013; Vergne 
and Wry, 2014), much of the existing categories studies literature has seldom focused 
attention on how power relations are implicated in the construction and maintenance of a new 
market category, especially those categories with hybrid forms. Much of the locus of debate 
in categories studies has focused primarily on the ‘imperative’ to reduce uncertainty 
(Zuckerman, 1999; Hsu, Hannan, Koçak, 2009) and the illegitimacy costs imposed on 
category spanning, hybrid organizational forms (Zuckerman, 1999; Hsu, Hannan, and Koçak, 
2009; Polos, Hannan, and Carroll, 2002; Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2005), which often 
suggests that hybrids may not be desirable. Although recent work has begun to illuminate 
some of their benefits (Ruef and Patterson, 2009, Pontikes, 2012, Granqvist, Grodal, and 
Woolley, 2013; Paolella and Durand, 2016), we still know little about the political processes 
that lead to the creation and leveraging of hybrid categories.  
To redress this underexamined aspect within the categories studies literature, we 
employ a socio-cultural and political agency lens (Glynn and Navis, 2013; Bowker and Star, 
1999) that emphasizes political contestation in category construction and the role of actors in 
manipulating cultural symbols, beliefs and norms to understand hybrid category construction 
and maintenance. In doing so, we take an expanded view of the existing socio-cognitive 
literature (Durand and Paolella, 2013) and conceive of categories as cultural resources or 
toolkits (Swidler, 1986; Glynn and Navis, 2013) that shape how people understand the world 
(cf. Foucault, 1977; Khan, Munir, and Wilmott, 2007). 
Our purpose in this chapter is to examine the construction and strategic use of hybrid 
categories and to explore the manner in which they act as political devices to legitimate 
nascent practices and in this particular case, objectionable discourses. We do this by asking 
the research question: how is a hybrid category constructed and employed for political 
advantage?  To address this question, our research study looks at the case of ‘impact 
investing’, a hybrid investment category where organizational actors aim to achieve both 
social and economic returns.   Specifically, our case focuses on the experience of the New 
Forests Company (NFC) in Uganda, a portfolio company of the Agri-Vie impact investment 
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fund. This is an instance in which a ‘socially responsible’ impact investing portfolio company 
was able to marshal resources from global investors, create unique social and political 
arrangements for its own strategic advantage.  
We describe how membership in a hybrid category such as impact investing was used 
to perpetuate unequal power relations. In our case, organizational actors were able to achieve 
this accomplishment by strategically using the hybrid category as a political device to contest 
and exert power, to acquire resources, to shape audience perceptions, and to shape social and 
political arrangements. 
 In the remainder of the chapter we outline our theoretical position, describe our 
methods of data collection and analysis, present our case study and discuss our findings.  
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
Politics, Power and Categories 
As powerful organizing devices, categories are political and cultural productions 
fraught with contention. They are significant sites of political and ethical work and are often 
spaces of political struggles and socially charged agendas, sometimes hidden under the guise 
of technical and bureaucratic rationalization (Bowker and Star, 1999: 196, 319).  For 
instance, historians and sociologists have examined the tremendous increase in medical 
classifications in the late nineteenth century both as a political force and as an organizing 
rubric for complex bureaucracies; from studies that detail the individual categories linked to 
social movements such as the diagnosis of homosexuality as an illness and its de-
medicalization after direct and vigorous lobbying by the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender (LGBT) civil rights advocates (Kirk and Kutchins, 1992) to the reclassification 
of GRID - Gay Related Autoimmune Disorder to AIDS- acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (Grmek, 1990).  
While bringing social and moral order to human interaction, categories can give an 
advantage to some groups while rendering other groups to subjugation and abject suffering 
(Bowker and Star, 1999:6). In this vein, Foucault’s (1970; 1982) work focused on the concept 
of order and its implementation in categorical discourse, examining how the ubiquity of 
categories can appear like Weber’s iron cage of bureaucratic discipline. The most striking 
example of this is the case of racial classification, the typology at the core of physical 
anthropology (Bowker and Star, 1999). The conception of race as a ‘type’ is based on 
empiricist principles of classification taxonomy originally developed in the natural sciences 
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and it encouraged a belief in the existence of ideal categories and stressed difference and 
division over similarity and convergence (Bowker and Star, 1999). This was subsequently 
overlaid by “binary based notions of superiority and inferiority; the search for pure racial 
types could not easily be reconciled with the evident fact that in practice only hybrids 
existed” (Dubow, 1995:114-115 in Bowker and Star, 1999:202).  
In order to understand the stability of such power relations in a variety of settings it is 
helpful to focus on how power operates in the first place. Khan et al (2007) suggest that such 
an analysis must be premised on a conceptualization of power as being conceived in ‘diverse 
formulations, as articulating competing politico-ethical projects and associated perspectives 
that render it meaningful and effectual in a variety of ways’ (Khan, Munir, and Wilmott, 
2007:1058).  Accordingly, in trying to understand the implication of categories in power 
relations, we depart from the application of an (more typically used) actor-centric lens and 
adopt a Foucauldian (1977) view that suggests: 
‘there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose or constitute at the 
same time power relations … it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge 
that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but 
power/knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it 
is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.’ 
(Foucault, 1977: 27–28). 
 
It is in this ‘constitution of a field of knowledge’ and the creation of different 
identities that categories play a crucial role; whereby, different domains of knowledge and 
activity are delineated and legitimated. They embody different meanings, evoke different 
associations and are vested with particular interests. For instance, racial or gender-based 
classifications, or official declaration of a particular site as a ‘heritage’ or a political group as 
‘terrorist’ carry the potential to significantly alter existing social configurations and our 
behaviour and attitude towards the groups or artefacts in question.  
 
Hybrid Categories and Power Relations 
Interestingly, when different categories are merged to form new ones, such dynamics 
are not neatly reversed or added up in predictable ways. The new category has to be 
legitimated as well, not only because of the cognitive dissonance it causes, but also because 
of the agency required. Many new hybrid categories bridge previously disparate fields and 
serve as mechanisms to transfer knowledge across different domains—they include new 
categories such as social enterprises (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2010; 
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Tracey et al., 2010; Battilana and Lee, 2014), sustainable and ethical investment (Markowitz 
et al., 2011), and Fair Trade (Raynolds, 2002; Reinecke, 2010; Renard, 2003). These 
particular market categories are characterized by their hybridity meaning that they combine 
multiple organizational forms or institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Greenwood 
et al., 2010; Thornton et al., 2012; Battilana and Lee, 2014) in unique ways and can often 
operate in complex institutional settings marked by heightened risk, ambiguity or uncertainty 
like biotech firms, nanotech firms or multi-strategy hedge funds in emerging markets (cf. 
Lounsbury and Rao, 2004; Markowitz et al., 2011; Tracey et al., 2010; Pontikes, 2012; Smith 
2011).    
These hybrids function as bridges between disparate categories and can often bestow 
legitimacy on nascent categories or practices that were previously considered illegitimate.  
Even though hybrids hold such intrigue, scant attention has been given towards 
understanding the mechanisms by which they might be exploited. 
It is this process of combining categories, its antecedents and consequences that we 
explore in this chapter. Our examination of the construction, maintenance and strategic use of 
hybrid categories allows us to understand how the concept of power entangled with the 
process of category construction can also be understood as performative, as it participates in 
conveying particular perspectives that construct and depict the social world in distinctive 
power/knowledge frameworks.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Context 
Impact investing refers to the use of investment capital to help solve social or 
environmental problems around the world with the expectation of financial returns. The 
impact investing business model can take on a fund management structure where capital is 
invested indirectly in a company through a pooled investment vehicle known as a fund, or the 
capital can be invested directly into a company. Unlike ethical investing or socially 
responsible investing (SRI) which focus on the negative screening of alcohol, tobacco, and 
firearms, and a range of businesses and activities which do not damage society, impact 
investing is positioned by its practitioners as taking a proactive approach; actively identifying 
businesses with the intent to achieve both a financial return and to create a positive social or 
environmental impact.  
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Impact Investors Look to Africa: For most impact investments, the intended impact is 
usually focused on underserved populations whereby the impact is likely delivered through 
the business operations, processes employed by the business, or the products or services 
produced. Given the need to maximize social impact, Sub Saharan Africa has the largest 
concentration of impact investment projects. Despite receiving less than 5 percent of global 
foreign direct investment (FDI), it represents over 40 percent of impact investment projects 
globally (Simon and Barmeier, 2010), as shown in Figure 1.  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
The recent increase in capital flow towards the continent in the last ten years can be 
attributed in part to the growing discourse around private capital investment to address social 
and economic development problems. With over US$50 billion in FDI now flowing toward 
Africa (as shown in Figure 2), the data suggests a continent that may be experiencing a 
resurgence of foreign investor interest and now serves as a new destination for capital.   
  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The impact of the international global financial crisis dramatically changed the 
perspective of investors regarding investment opportunities around the world, especially in 
places like Africa. The focus shifted away from Western markets, many of them devastated 
by the crisis, to emerging and ‘frontier’ markets.  For most of the twentieth century, the 
conventional conception of the African continent was that of a ‘basket case’ consumed by 
war, violence, and disease; the continent was mostly seen as the primary destination for 
Western aid and ‘synonymous with failure and poverty’ (Ferguson, 2006: 5). Undoubtedly, 
the continent had suffered from endemic issues of extreme poverty and intractable political 
conflict.  However, over the last 10 years, private investment in Africa steadily rose. During 
this period, a new narrative of “Africa Rising” and individual countries as ‘frontier’ markets was 
promoted by investment bankers, investors, African governments and development finance 
institutions operating on the continent. This new narrative emphasized Africa’s growing 
macroeconomic and political stability combined with growth in consumer markets and 
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enhanced regional integration.  The new narrative was instrumental in changing mind-sets 
about investment opportunities on the continent and led to a growing diversity in the 
composition of impact investors, ranging from foundations, investment banks and private 
equity funds. 
Increasingly, development finance institutions (DFIs) such as the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank’s private lending arm, the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), and the African Development Bank (AfDB), to name a few, began to cultivate 
strategies to boost investment, especially agricultural investment. One key strategy they 
employed was to increase investment to financial intermediaries such as private equity 
investment funds, as one way to tackle food security issues and poverty alleviation. At least 
15 private equity funds were established, with the specific objective of investing in 
agricultural production and processing in Africa. These private equity funds represented 
potential investment inflows of more than US$2 billion (AVCA, 2011); such examples 
included the Actis Africa Agribusiness Fund, African Agricultural Capital and the Phatisa 
African Agri Fund. 
Another such fund was the Agri-Vie Agribusiness Fund (Agri-Vie), an agribusiness 
focused private equity fund created with the purpose of making growth equity and equity-
related investments in food agribusiness companies in Sub-Saharan Africa. From inception, 
the fund was created to make investments in commercially attractive agribusiness projects 
with sound environmental and social practices.  
 Agri-Vie reached financial close in November 2010 at a size of US$110 million, the 
fund was oversubscribed and closed 10 per cent higher than originally anticipated. Agri-Vie’s 
oversubscription during the challenging economic climate following the financial crisis 
demonstrated the investor appetite for agribusiness and impact investments.   Table 1 
provides an overview of investors in Agri-Vie. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
   
We explore this particular phenomenon in great detail as we examine the case of the 
New Forests Company (NFC), a portfolio company of the Agri Vie impact investing fund. 
NFC invests in sustainable timber processing and operates in parts of East Africa. The case 
focuses primarily on the NFC operations in Uganda and their land dispute with local 
communities.  
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  This context provides insight to a central conflict in the case between NFC and the 
claims made by the local communities of Kiboga and Mubende in the central region of 
Uganda. The NFC case in Uganda serves as an extreme example of how membership within 
the impact investing category can be used for political advantage, especially in a complex 
institutional setting. The African context of this case provides examples of identity politics, 
unequal power relations and a complex regulatory environment, all of which serve to 
demonstrate how a hybrid category can be utilized for political advantage.  There are several 
actors and events within the case; to provide more clarity, Table 2 provides a list of key 
acronyms that appear throughout the case. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Data Sources and Data Collection 
This chapter is part of a larger research study on the emergence of impact investing 
and its growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Table 3 provides an inventory of the type of data 
collected over the course of the larger research project.  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Documents, Media Reports and Archives:  The primary source of data were 
documents.  To develop an understanding of the dynamics within impact investing at the 
societal and field level, we gathered (i) media reports and press releases, in addition to, (ii) 
organizational brochures and annual reports from impact investing organizations. We used 
Factiva as a data source for media reports because it is a public, comprehensive, and primary 
outlet for news on the research subjects (Navis and Glynn, 2010: 447). We also gathered 
articles, press releases, and archival interviews from the Global Impact Investing Network 
(GIIN), a global impact investing industry association.  To understand the details of the New 
Forests Company case in Uganda, we gathered documentary evidence from organizations 
such as Oxfam, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank.  We also 
gathered supporting documents on hearings, legal archives, public fact-finding reports, 
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Internet documents, and research published by NGOs and multi-lateral development 
organizations. In total, this comprised over 10,000 text pages.  
Semi-structured Interviews: We employed a purposeful sampling technique (Kumar 
et al., 1993), relying initially on the Global Impact Investing Network database to identify 
key informants who have insight into the emergence of impact investing or unique 
knowledge about the history, strategies, and practices of the emerging investment category 
and its growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. The overarching objective was to interview a cross-
section of people representative of diverse participants in the field and also those who may 
have had direct knowledge of the New Forests Company case. We developed an interview 
database and relied primarily on the interview notes and transcripts from 35 key informants 
and 27 archival interviews with industry participants accessed from the GIIN database.	 	
Data Analysis  
Analytical Approach: Our analytical approach for the study was open-ended, iterative 
and inductive (Strauss and Corbin, 1998 Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Langley, 1999). The goal 
was to build and refine theory from rich case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003).  
We sought to construct an analytic narrative of the formation and evolution of the impact 
investing market category and the emergence of new funds like Agri-Vie in addition to 
understanding the events of the New Forests Company in Uganda. We proceeded with the 
analysis by first following recommendations for case-based research (Yin, 2003) and the 
detection of patterns in process studies; this strategy involved the construction of a detailed 
narrative from the raw data (Langley, 1999).  Following these guidelines, we first created a 
case archive database and a chronological narrative of the brief history of impact investing 
and its emergence. 
Through this analysis we established a timeline of the main events within impact 
investing and the historical, social, and organizational contexts within which these events 
took place. In this step, we identified the year 2007 as a key initial point of the emergence of 
impact investing, when the term was first coined. We also collected archive information on 
key actors (organizations and individuals), investment trends and information regarding 
specific investment vehicles and events surrounding them such as the creation of the Agri-
Vie investment vehicle and the subsequent events surrounding its portfolio company, the 
New Forests Company (NFC).   
The analysis subsequently followed established techniques and procedures for 
naturalistic inquiry (Dacin et al., 2010) and a grounded-theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 
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1967; Locke, 2002), whereby we could engage in an iterative process of collecting and 
analyzing data while continually comparing existing and new data along emerging 
dimensions of interest (McPherson and Sauder, 2013). 
From a constructivist ontology (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991; Guba and Lincoln, 1994), 
the narrative described in this chapter serves as one of the principal outcomes of this process 
oriented research. The objective here was to achieve an understanding of organizational 
phenomena not through formal propositions but by providing to the reader, a “vicarious 
experience”; thus the contextual detail in the narrative (“thick description”) allows the reader 
to “judge the transferability of the ideas to other situations” (Langley, 1999: 695).  
The study employed established strategies which scholars have adopted for the 
analysis of field data in an effort to avoid the risk of imposing an overly simplistic and 
inaccurate framework on social reality (Barley, 1990) while maintaining the narrative fidelity 
of the actors and the research context.   
 
CASE STUDY 
Birth of a Hybrid Category: The Emergence of Impact Investing 
 
In the late 2000s, several key societal factors converged to generate an increasing 
interest in the creation of a hybrid market category by the name of ‘impact investing.’ To 
begin with, the 2008–2009 global financial crisis triggered panic among investors regarding 
the risk of their investment decisions. Investors began looking for alternative investment 
opportunities, while banks and fund managers looked to create new investment offerings. 
After the financial meltdown, the financial sector participants were actively looking for ways 
to redeem themselves and create new bonds of trust and legitimacy with investors and the 
public. These concerns came together in the form of a new realization that the financial sector 
should somehow be seen as acting for the public good as well. Figure 3 below provides an 
overview of key events in our case. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Creating New Knowledge and Defining a New Collective Identity 
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In October 2007 the Rockefeller Foundation1 hosted a series of international meetings 
at their Bellagio Center in Italy with high net worth individuals, entrepreneurs, foundations, 
government agency representatives, banks, fund managers and non-profit organizations that 
had been engaged in a set of similar activities whereby they invested or made philanthropic 
contributions in order to achieve social or environmental impact. Many of these participants 
engaged in activities such as corporate social responsibility, socially-responsible investing, 
blended-value investing, and venture philanthropy. This group gathered to discuss the similar 
approaches and challenges they faced in their investment practices. It was at this meeting that 
the term ‘impact investing’ was created, a composite label that reflected the collective desire 
to achieve both social impact and financial return from investment.  
One Foundation Manager, who recalled the meeting during an interview, described 
the ubiquity of the term: 
I think the point was to create a term that lots of different people can self-identify 
with. So whether you were active in microfinance in India or energy investing in the 
US or low-income housing development in Mexico, there was an overarching set of 
concepts that were drafted together under one tent. And there was, I think, a 
legitimate critique that there was already a tower of Babel in the space, so we needed 
a new term (ID16, Foundation Manager). 
The term impact investing thus reflected a ‘compromise identity’ (Fligstein and 
McAdam, 2011), that could bring many groups together and in the process, each group’s 
identity and interests could be transformed to align with the broader collective identity.  
While comprehensive in scope, the term was contentious. Some investors and fund 
managers claimed that it was not possible to achieve attractive returns while promoting social 
impact. Similarly, many argued that their primary fiduciary responsibility was to provide 
financial returns.  One U.K fund manager was quoted as saying: “We are not here to be 
philanthropic, that’s someone else’s job: government, charities and foundations” (quoted in 
Williams and Carter, 2010); others argued that it was not appropriate to mix social issues 
with investment decisions as it may lead to mission drift or strategic confusion while others 
wanted more data driven results; as one investor contended: “there is no hard evidence that 
taking social investment criteria into account will lead to better returns”  (Williams and 
Carter, 2010). That such objections arose, reflects the motive behind the creation of an impact 
investing hybrid category. A key plank of the strategy was to suggest that organizations could 
reap attractive returns while investing in socially worthwhile sectors. What kind of returns, 
and which sectors, however remained to be determined. 
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Notably, the hybrid category took visible material form with a strategic partnership 
between the Rockefeller Foundation and J.P. Morgan. With these two organizations as the 
central leaders and key pioneers of impact investing, it became evident that these well-
resourced, highly skilled social actors could garner the legitimacy and attention necessary to 
institutionalize impact investing as a legitimate investment category and promote it as a new, 
differentiated asset class.2  
Through the creation of the impact investing category, these actors created a new 
architecture of knowledge.  In combining disparate categories, a new boundary was drawn 
around a set of activities that had already been in existence. Moreover, new standards, ratings 
systems and performance metrics for how to measure impact came into being. In addition, 
these institutional entrepreneurs created a new certification system, the B Corporation or ‘B 
Corp’3, to safeguard against the dilution of the impact investing identity. In the same way that 
the Fair Trade label or the USDA Organic label helps consumers to differentiate between 
food products, a B Corp label makes it easier to differentiate between the ‘good companies’ 
and those that are just good at marketing. The ‘pioneers’ of the category also created the 
Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) to generate research reports to disseminate this new 
knowledge and to protect the integrity of the new category. In other words, a whole 
institutional field gradually emerged around the new hybrid category. 
 
New Forests Company and the Politics of Identity 
The New Forests Company (NFC) was originally founded in 2004 by Julian Ozanne, 
an entrepreneur from the UK who partnered with institutional shareholders to build one of 
only two, plantation forestry and timber companies of enterprise scale in East Africa. NFC 
was set up as a for-profit, commercially focused enterprise with commitments to 
sustainability and stakeholder engagement.  In an interview with one of the authors, the head 
of corporate social responsibility for NFC explained the company’s approach to community 
engagement: 
In each of our countries we have the CSR program manager who’s our national level 
senior official for this department who manages a lot of high level relationships and 
then who manages the team of community development officers.  
Then we have a community development officer on every single plantation and his or 
her job is really solely to be the liaison between the company and the communities. 
They live in the community, they sleep in the community, they understand the issues. 
They have their fingers on the pulse of the buzz and what’s happening so that they can 
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start to identify issues before they really blowup. I would say that’s a really important 
part of our risk mitigation protocol (ID115, NFC Manager). 
 
 
The CSR head noticeably emphasized community engagement to demonstrate the importance 
NFC placed on social responsibility and positive environmental impact.  This emphasis 
reflects the importance they placed on abiding by the membership characteristics of impact 
investing organizations. 
 Around the time impact investing was beginning to emerge as a formal investment 
category, the New Forests Company was growing into a highly successful player in the 
plantation market.  The company grew and cultivated plantations for local and regional 
export markets and was a key player in the emerging multibillion-dollar market for trading 
carbon-credits under the Kyoto Protocol. By growing forests in African countries, NFC could 
sell credits from the carbon dioxide soaked up by its trees to polluters abroad (Kron, 2011).  
In Uganda, NFC had more than 20,000 hectares of forestry land and operated three 
pine and eucalyptus plantations in the Mubende, Kiboga and Bugiri districts of central 
Uganda. In 2004, NFC began negotiating with the Ugandan Government for a commercial 
timber deal. NFC was welcomed because of its plan to invest US$47 million over ten years in 
the country. It had already planted around 12 million pine and eucalyptus trees on 9,300 
hectares employing more than 1,400 people. As a licensee of the land, NFC did not own or 
lease the land in the Mubende or Kiboga districts. Its license came with strict conditions, 
including not to grow food crops or allow cattle grazing and to ‘strictly defend the boundaries 
of the reserves’.4 The land was ‘gazetted’, which meant it was considered constitutionally 
protected land within the Namwasa and Luwunga Central Forest Reserves (CFRs). Land 
delineated as CFRs according to the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act of 2003,5 was 
protected by the government and only specific activities could take place, such as 
conservation of indigenous forests, wildlife conservation and tourism or forestry. In 
Mubende, the gazetted land that the state licensed to NFC was the Namwasa Forest Reserve 
(8,958 hectares), and in Kiboga, it was the Luwunga Forest Reserve (9,383 hectares). There 
are also special laws governing forest reserves that make it illegal to grow crops, graze cattle, 
or erect buildings6. Based on these laws, NFC claimed it was not required to offer any 
villagers living on the government land any compensation in the event of removal7.  
Unsurprisingly, the government granted the company a 50-year license to develop 
three timber plantations in the Mubende, Kiboga, and Bugiri districts, with the expectation 
that it could earn up to US$1.8 million a year8. By 2005, the Ugandan National Forestry 
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Authority granted licenses over the plantation areas to NFC and then subsequently embarked 
on the procedures to remove the former residents of the land, which NFC claimed were 
‘illegal encroachers’.9  
The forced removal of the inhabitants was defended by NFC, along with reputable 
international organizations such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), an investor in 
Agri-Vie, and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), on the basis that the people on the land 
were ‘illegal encroachers’. This is a term Oxfam argues is ‘dangerously loaded’ because it 
pre-judges people’s rights and dehumanizes them, making it easier to justify violent tactics 
against community members and in their view, is arguably a highly misleading term because 
the people maintain that they did in fact have lawful entitlement to the land and were testing 
that argument in ongoing legal cases (Grainger and Geary, 2011:4). While cloaking 
themselves under the safety of membership within the impact investing category, it appeared 
as if NFC delegitimized the claims and rights of the local people to the land.   
Beginning in 2006 until 2010, the government of Uganda removed more than 20,000 
people from their homes to make way for NFC’s telephone-pole and construction-material 
venture. Police and army troops deployed by Uganda's National Forestry Agency (NFA) 
reportedly burned homes and destroyed crops and livestock to get people to leave land that 
had been licensed by the government to the New Forests Company (McGroarty, 2011). 
During an interview, an NFC executive told us:  
In Uganda, one of the major challenges we had from the beginning is that we got 
licensed to grow trees on two central forest reserves […] Our instructions were in no 
uncertain terms, “Thank you very much, that’s very nice of you. But you’re a guest in 
this country and you will not be compensating Ugandans, that’s the government’s job 
if we see fit” (ID115, NFC Manager).10 
 According to Oxfam, NFC stated in its 2010 Sustainability Report that: 	
Using the law is not always the appropriate course of action as it is always the poorest 
who suffer most and irrespective of the legal position we have a moral obligation, and 
a pragmatic need, to win hearts and minds and mitigate negative consequences of our 
investment.11 	
Conversely, in this case however, NFC argued that:  “no party has proven that the land was 
de–gazetted and thus the encroachers are illegally occupying land leased to an independent 
third party” (NFC)12. The company seemingly relied upon an ‘extensive and exhaustive 
government-driven authentication process’, which it says confirmed that only 31 families 
were on the Namwasa Reserve, and none in the Luwunga Reserve had legal rights to remain 
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on the land.13 NFC responded that it was respecting the rights of these families and that 
dealing with ‘illegal’ settlers is the sole mandate of the NFA.14  
Moreover, NFC claims the people left the land in a peaceful and voluntary manner. 
Our key informant at NFC insisted during an interview that: “A lot of people moved off the 
reserves […] willingly when they knew the company was coming and that was partially 
because they understood the company was going to create jobs and invest in the communities 
and provide other kinds of opportunities” (ID115, NFC Manager). 
 
Weak Institutional Setting 
A close examination of the case suggests that the Ugandan government at both local 
and national levels appears to have played a central role in the evictions in Mubende and 
Kiboga given that they allocated land to NFC that was already legally occupied by 
community members.   
 NFC was licensed land by the Ugandan government for timber development in the 
region; however, up until the mid-2000s, the Ugandan national authorities had seemed to 
allow or even endorse the local communities’ rights to the land in which they occupied. 
According to Oxfam, in Mubende, descendants of war veterans were offered land with 
approval of the local government authority, and people’s applications to convert from 
customary to leasehold title, or to register public land for agricultural purchases, were being 
processed by government authorities; and in Kiboga, local councils and administrative 
structures representing the evictees were recognized by the government (Grainger and Geary, 
2011:9). 
 According to the Ugandan NGO, ACODE which studied the role of the National 
Forestry Authority (NFA) towards local community members, this generally accepting 
attitude towards the people in the reserved land began to diminish, particularly with the 
creation of the NFA in 2003 and the growing demand for private sector development 
(Mugeyeyi et al., 2005).  At which point, the government began to sanction the forced 
evictions of people on the land to make way for private enterprise development. The 
government authorities also failed to assist evictees with compensation or securing alternative 
land. 
Many land transactions in this context can often lack transparency.  As the Uganda 
Land Alliance noted, ‘the details of these big land acquisitions are often shrouded in secrecy, 
particularly the really big ones, which seem to be negotiated at a very high level᾿ (Esther 
Obaikol, Executive Director, Uganda Land Alliance quoted in Oxfam, 2011:26). In cases 
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where local communities are consulted, consultations tend to be biased against the equal 
participation of women, even where the (primary and secondary) ‘use rights’ of women are 
heavily affected because in many cases women often have no formal land ownership rights 
(Oxfam, 2011:23). We have seen parallels to this in other contexts around the world. For 
instance, in Sialkot Pakistan, we observed how the long-standing practice of child labor was 
eliminated from the world’s largest soccer ball manufacturing cluster by progressive industry 
and NGOs activists without fully understanding the local context only to result in the 
unintended consequence of disrupting families and communities, plunging them deeper into 
poverty (Khan et al, 2010).     
Despite the rhetoric about the moral obligation to intervene on behalf of communities 
irrespective of the legal framework, NFC seemed to play the weak institutional context in 
Uganda to its advantage, while maintaining legitimacy through membership within the 
impact investing category.   During an interview with our key informant, she explained the 
difficulty they experienced with the government and maintained that:  
 It became very difficult, you can imagine a very difficult scenario for us because 
international standards state that a company must engage with communities and talk 
about compensation. Then the government’s rules and regulations […] say you may 
not, as a guest in this country, start compensating people and raising expectations 
across the country. That was what started the issue in Uganda (ID115, NFC 
Manager).15 	
Although NFC could communicate the impact investing and sustainability ideal to 
investors to ensure their legitimacy with the international audience, in the local context of 
Uganda, they were seemingly unable to use the privileges of their membership in the 
category for the benefit of local community members.  
 
Strategic Use of Hybrid Category Membership for Political Advantage 
 How was NFC allowed to maintain its forceful stance against those who lived on the 
land it wanted to cultivate? To understand this, we need to look into the creation and 
performance of a particular identity by NFC and its membership within the impact investing 
hybrid category.  
Much of the protection NFC enjoyed could be attributed to its identity as a bona fide 
member of the impact investing community. This identity was confirmed when international 
organizations such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), HSBC, and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) invested in it either directly or through the Agri-Vie impact 
investment fund. Despite the challenges with the local communities, NFC had positioned 
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itself so well as a sustainable, socially responsible company that by 2010, the Agri-Vie 
impact investing fund made a US$6.7 million investment into the company. Its organizational 
identity as a sustainable ‘impact investing’ portfolio company of Agri-Vie conferred special 
membership benefits within the investment category.  Our informant from Agri-Vie described 
their investment approach: “We anchor our investment in these companies, and our role is to 
work with these companies to help make them even more successful, to grow them, and get 
them to an even more sustainable and successful level […]”(ID24, Fund Manager). 
As a recipient of capital from Agri-Vie and other global investors, NFC was 
subject to the International Finance Corporation’s safeguards. In fact, as part of its due 
diligence of the investment in Agri-Vie, the IFC also conducted due diligence on NFC and its 
operations. The IFC claims to have strict criteria to determine which projects it invests in, 
including community consultation and social and environmental safeguards. Indeed, many 
other public and private financial institutions refer to these performance standards.16 For 
instance, IFC’s standards form the basis of the Equator Principles.17 International financial 
institutions, extractive industry companies, and socially responsible investment fund 
managers have expressed growing support for the principle of free, prior, and informed 
consent in recent years, these principles and standards undergird the foundations of impact 
investing.  Our informant at NFC referred to it as “the bible” and asserted, “That’s what 
we’re driven by and what we’re governed by” (ID115, NFC Manager).  The affiliation with 
IFC standards provided NFC with legitimacy and shielded the company from deeper scrutiny 
and criticism from international investors. 
 Similarly to the IFC, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) has standards relating to 
the rights of local people facing ‘involuntary resettlement’. The FSC certifies forestry 
investments that adhere to best operating practices regarding labor, social, and environmental 
issues; its standards state that special attention will be paid to social issues of land acquisition 
for plantations, especially the protection of local rights of ownership, use, or access.’18 
 In 2010, over 120 million hectares were certified by the FSC in over 80 countries 
around the world, the equivalent of roughly 5 per cent of the world’s production forests. 
While the FSC’s Principles and Criteria require the protection of local rights of ownership, 
use or access, the certification of operations sometimes falls short of this requirement, as in 
the case of NFC’s plantation in Mubende (Oxfam, 2011:36). 
 Quite notably, the New Forests Company proclaimed that it got FSC certification 
even though it did not really require it given that its business strategy does not include the 
export of timber products to Europe, Asia, or the Americas. NFC acknowledged that the 
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primary motivation to secure certification was the perception that the FSC represented the 
‘gold seal of approval’ for responsible and professional forest management, stakeholder 
involvement, consultation and conservation (NFC Sustainability Report, 2013:13). 
Ultimately, this revealed whom NFC considered as its primary stakeholders: investors, 
regulators, international media and other audiences in Europe, Asia and the Americas, not 
necessarily local community members. FSC certification provided a clear signal to these 
audiences about the identity, experience, and track record of the company, while giving it a 
shield against any potential threats to its performed identity as a socially responsible 
company and maintaining its position of power, legitimacy and privilege.  
 Although it operates in East Africa, the FSC certification places the New Forests 
Company in the same category as world-class timber operators in Europe and North America; 
the certification allows the company to assume the legitimacy afforded to all other socially 
responsible companies operating in developed countries. Thus, it provides credibility and 
legitimizes their operations, opening the floodgates for investor capital. This was an effective 
strategy considering how NFC, as a new, pre-profitability company was able to attract 
investors such as Agri-Vie, EIB, and HSBC. NFC was also able to rely on its FSC 
certification to obtain carbon credits from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
referred to its plantation in the Mubende district in its application to obtain them19 (Oxfam, 
2011:38). 
 Interestingly, according to their own Sustainability Report, NFC’s quest to get an 
FSC accreditation started with an ‘FSC Mission᾿ to Africa in August of 2012, when NFC 
hosted the FSC Board of Directors on a 10-day tour through the Uganda and Tanzania 
forestry operations, together with three other East African commercial forestry companies.20 
NFC was able to marshal resources to host the entire board of directors of FSC. NFC 
suggests that: 
The aim of the mission was to expose the FSC to the challenges facing commercial 
forestry companies in East Africa – challenges which were observed to be 
dramatically different from Asia, Brazil and even the Congo basin. One result of this 
mission was the pledge that FSC would establish a regional FSC office in East Africa. 
This mission was hugely successful, with establishment of offices and recruitment of 
FSC representatives underway (NFC Sustainability Report, 2013:13).  
 
Beyond the hosting of the FSC Board of Directors, the senior leadership of the New 
Forests Company also frequently engaged with the FSC Director General, Mr. Kim 
Cartensen, to ensure that the focus and momentum of FSC was maintained in East Africa 
(NFC Sustainability Report, 2013:13).  
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 This close affiliation with FSC ostensibly allowed the NFC to manage and frame its 
own identity and construct the narrative of how the events in the Mubende and Kiboga 
communities transpired. The firm appeared to have been able to wield its influence with the 
FSC, where the local communities lacked the social capital and material resources to shape 
audience perceptions in the same way and directly frame their own narrative for the FSC to 
consider.  
 
Hybrid Category Membership for the Transfer of Legitimacy  
 On the surface, the New Forests Company appeared as the gold standard for 
sustainable investment, one that any impact investor would seriously consider. In 2008, the 
Uganda Investment Authority named NFC an ‘Investor of the Year.’21 The company garnered 
financial support from blue-chip international investment firms and development institutions 
and accumulated accolades, certifications and ratings; markers that send all of the right 
signals to global impact investors. As late as 2012, NFC garnered a coveted five-star rating 
(the highest possible) from the Global Impact Investing Rating System (GIIRS). GIIRS 
claims to be a ‘comprehensive and transparent system for assessing the social and 
environmental impact of companies and funds with a ratings and analytics approach’ that is 
supposed to be analogous to rating systems found in traditional finance and investment 
management (i.e. Morningstar investment rankings).22  During an interview, one of our key 
informants from B Lab, the non-profit that manages GIIRS and helped to craft the 
methodology for the rating system, explained: 
The whole idea behind GIIRS was to provide a platform from where investors, funds, 
and companies can measure what matters to them. That gets pegged to a specific 
score that translates into a star rating for companies and for fund managers; they get 
an overall score based on how their underlying portfolio works (ID114, Ratings 
Associate, B Lab). 
 
 The process for obtaining such a rating is intended to be rigorous, transparent and 
analytically driven; the aim is to shape investor behavior by directing them towards GIIRS-
rated companies and the impact investing space in general. So, for NFC, this was another 
imprimatur that helped it to mobilize capital and gain legitimacy from institutional investors. 
The company was very proud of this certification, especially because it was considered as a 
GIIRS Pioneer Company, among the first 200 rated companies, ‘setting the standard as a 
leading, mission-driven business creating positive social and environmental impact in the 
forestry and value-added timber products sectors.’23 NFC went to great lengths to promote 
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this five-star rating, it appeared prominently within the first couple pages of the FY2013 
Sustainability Report and boldly on the website. 
 Achieving this five-star rating further shaped the identity of the company with internal 
and external audiences and solidified its membership within the impact investing category. 
Despite the threats looming from the harrowing events that occurred in Uganda, to the global 
investment community, NFC looked like the prototype for the impact investing hybrid 
category. The certification from GIIRS was another stamp of approval; it differentiated the 
company from other comparable investment opportunities and legitimized it with 
international investors.  
 It is important to note that Agri-Vie was also rated by GIIRS and received a five-star 
rating in 2012 with the added distinction of being a GIIRS Pioneer Fund and Agribusiness 
Investment Initiative of the Year.24 This award was given even as the International Finance 
Corporations’ CAO Ombudsman was still conducting its investigation and assessment 
regarding the affected communities in Uganda. The overwhelming focus on standards, 
metrics, and ratings routinely left many potential impact investors blind to what was really 
happening on the ground. Companies like NFC and investment funds like Agri-Vie have 
gone to great lengths to ‘pioneer’ impact investing and sustainability standards so that they 
can in turn mobilize more capital, presumably to achieve commercial and social and/or 
environmental returns.   
 Our informant on the core team at B Lab was asked about how they incorporate the 
perspectives of local communities into the rating process. Her response about the case was 
revealing about the challenges of inclusive engagement with the local communities:  
The issue in Uganda is something that did come up during the rating process. It’s 
something that we highlighted in the report. Having the disclosure questionnaire, there 
are additional questions around local engagement. We have questions that are more 
around client engagement, client satisfaction, quality management. Those are things 
that we are developing as it moves forward. But, as I said, it’s a work-in-progress 
(ID114, Ratings Associate, B Lab). 
Despite the efforts to create the most intricate metrics and reporting systems, there 
seems to have been a failure to include the voices of those who were to be directly affected 
by the impact investments; effectively, their voices were muted because they lacked the 
economic and political capital to shape the new knowledge architecture of impact investing, 
specifically its definitions, standards and metrics. Within the architecture of the hybrid 
category, investors and other well-resourced actors carried disproportionately more power 
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and legitimacy. NFC was able to strategically use their position as an impact investing 
portfolio company with strong political affiliations and certifications to gain legitimacy with 
international investors while delegitimizing the voices of community members affected by 
their operations.   Figure 4 depicts the process and mechanisms by which NFC was able to 
strategically use the hybrid category of impact investing.  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
To be sure, we do not argue nor assume that NFC was acting with purposeful intent to 
harm the local people in Uganda. What the data does suggest is that NFC was seemingly able 
to take advantage of the privileges of membership within the hybrid category of impact 
investing.  Thus, NFC was able to employ three primary strategies which allowed it to use the 
hybrid category as a political device for strategic advantage: i) with capital from Agri-Vie, 
NFC could take advantage of the new architecture of knowledge created by the hybrid 
category of impact investing; by positioning itself as an impact investing portfolio company, 
NFC employed a sustainability ethos that served to legitimize its activities while 
delegitimizing threats to its performed identity; this form of identity politics was a 
mechanism that placed the company above reproach from global investors; ii) the company 
also used its position as a sustainable impact investing company to circumvent the weak 
institutional and regulatory setting of the Ugandan context for strategic advantage, portraying 
itself as socially responsible to investors, while the outcome of its operations played out very 
differently in the local context; and finally, the company iii) promulgated its membership and 
political affiliations with impact investors and certification bodies in order to legitimize its 
activities while delegitimizing the position of community members who opposed their 
activities, further maintaining unequal relations of power. Table 4 summarizes the time line 
of key political actions and outcomes in the case. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 For many, impact investing emerged as a new investment category at a time of global 
crisis. It brought coherence to a set of already existing but disparate activities. It held the 
promise of a new way to invest, a way to harness the power of private capital and deploy it 
for the greater good. Not only did this hybrid approach to investing allow participants to ‘do 
well and do good’ it also appealed to hard-nosed investors. It seemed as if there was finally a 
way to attract the attention of big institutional investors and provide them with more than just 
anecdotal stories about social impact but instead provide them with data-driven evidence of 
sustainable impact alongside commercial returns. Impact investing appeared as the way to 
gain legitimacy for a set of investment activities taking place in new, risky frontier markets. 
 Consequently, the category was conceived and ostensibly used as a political resource 
to gain legitimacy. As we saw in this case, NFC was able to assume the hybrid category 
identity, allowing the company to shape audience perceptions and maintain their association 
with the broader investment category. They used the hybrid category of impact investing as a 
shield to protect against surmounting threats and challenges to their performed and 
constructed identity.   
 The impact investing field constructed international standards and metrics for 
measuring social impact and defining membership within the category. Organizations like the 
NFC relied on their membership within the impact investing category as markers of 
legitimacy with global investors and government leaders. This membership also afforded 
them great political influence, privilege and strategic advantage against the poorly resourced 
villagers in Uganda.  
 The principal point we are making is that membership within the investment category 
conferred certain privileges, affording NFC the license to engage in certain practices while 
relatively protected from active scrutiny. Organizations often offer in their defense the fact 
that they have all the necessary credentials and membership within the right categories. As 
with all institutions, the criteria defining membership requirements are duly embodied with 
interests of the powerful. The parameters that define categories then, in turn, become 
implicated in creating asymmetries of new knowledge and ‘regimes of truth’ which underpin 
and sustain such interests. While well-resourced investors and managers are protected from 
reputational risk, there is little to protect vulnerable communities. The NFC case 
demonstrates how investors, managers, governments, regulatory and certifying agencies can 
align themselves around a hybrid category to create politically advantageous social 
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arrangements and political affiliations to achieve specific interests.  It reveals the power of 
hybrid categories as a means to create a new architecture of knowledge and a mechanism to 
transfer legitimacy among actors. In weak institutional and regulatory settings, where 
governments are not necessarily representing the interests of those who risk being displaced, 
hybrid categories such as impact investing can be availed for political advantage.  
Contributions 
 
While institutional theorists have examined the processes by which legitimacy is 
acquired and transferred through various mechanisms conferring social acceptance 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995; Zucker, 1977, 1989, 1991), there has been less 
attention focused on the use of hybrid categories as a political device for strategic advantage 
and to transfer legitimacy. In our case, membership within the impact investing hybrid 
category was conferred through the allocation of capital from the Agri-Vie investment fund 
to the New Forests Company. That being said, we do not suggest that a mere association was 
sufficient to ensure the transfer of legitimacy from Agri-Vie to the New Forests Company.  
NFC garnered broader audience legitimacy by strategically using the hybrid category. It 
engaged in identity politics to protect against perceived threats to its performed identity and 
benefited from the knowledge architecture (Foucault, 1977) created by the new hybrid 
category.  
Unequal relations of power arise when new knowledge architecture is created that 
separates those within the hybrid category and those outside of it. In this case, NFC’s ability 
to gain advantage from membership within the hybrid category of impact investing conferred 
social and political capital that could be wielded to marshal additional resources and to 
safeguard against identity threats. We posit that this process is most acute when audiences 
share similar world-views and when organizations operate within weak or complex 
institutional settings. 
To be sure, we do not imagine that the organizational actors described in the case 
conspired to inflict harm on vulnerable people. Our point is simply that these effects are 
integral to our case of category construction and maintenance, which relied upon, operated 
through, and reproduced what may be characterized as naturalized, taken-for-granted 
relations of power (Khan et al., 2007) and politics. 
As Durand and Paolella (2013) convincingly noted, the literature on categorization 
has overemphasized the stability of categories and the inertia of classificatory systems, 
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overlooking category dynamics and their development and evolution. Our primary focus was 
on category emergence and its related social and political dynamics. We contribute to 
literature on the emergence of new market categories (Rosa et al., 1999; Lounsbury and Rao, 
2004; Weber et al., 2008; Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010; Navis and Glynn, 2010). Our aim in 
this study was not to substantiate or invalidate prior work in this research stream but to 
uncover some of the tensions inherent within extant literature.  In an attempt to redress what 
we perceived to be an imbalance in the literature, this study examined how social actors 
construct, perform and strategically use hybrid categories.  
 In an attempt to broaden the perspective in categorization studies, recent work has 
focused on issues of membership, sameness, and distinctiveness, primarily examining the 
exogenous factors contributing to market category construction rather than an overt focus on 
the political contestation and social dynamics of category emergence (Navis and Glynn, 
2011; Rindova et al., 2011; Wry and Lounsbury, 2012; Wry et al., 2011; Glynn and Navis, 
2013). 
Navis and Glynn (2010) pose the question of how social actors navigate between 
sameness and distinctiveness in the emergence of a new market category. Though the 
nuanced and temporal insights offered by this study broaden our understanding on the 
process of legitimation, its research scope is limited in explaining how organizational actors 
or market participants might employ an identity associated with a particular category for 
strategic and political advantage.  In contrast, the data from this study reflects how the hybrid 
category functions as a political device to engage in identity politics.  Membership within the 
hybrid category conferred special privileges for organizational actors and allowed them to use 
the category to shield themselves from criticism and threats to their performed identity.  
Moreover, it allowed members to exercise influence with well-resourced, high-status actors 
that shared similar interests. 
  Secondly, we examined the social and political arrangements of social actors in the 
construction and maintenance of a hybrid category. This study revealed how high status, 
sophisticated social actors, with specific goals and interests were able to carefully construct 
partnerships, shared standards, metrics and other political arrangements for their strategic 
advantage. Through these arrangements, constructed within the architecture of the hybrid 
category, these actors were able to transfer knowledge and legitimacy from disparate 
categories and from diverse audiences and institutions.  We observed how the hybrid 
category functioned as a powerful political device for legitimizing a new investment practice 
that otherwise could have been deemed illegitimate, and allowed organizations to marshal 
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resources and exercise political influence especially in weak institutional settings.  Moreover, 
NFC’s adherence to the standards and tenets of membership to the hybrid category served to 
further institutionalize it, thus revealing the possibility of the co-construction of legitimacy 
between the category and the category member, an under-theorized phenomenon. The 
findings from the study suggest that this process might be most acute in weak or complex 
institutional settings where actors can perpetuate unequal power relations and asymmetries of 
knowledge; or where audiences have different world-views. The limits of this were reflected 
in a public relations campaign waged by Oxfam International against the operations of the 
New Forests Company, after which, NFC eventually agreed to a dispute resolution process 
and compensation agreement with the affected communities in Uganda and introduced new 
community development engagement programs.25 
Finally, it is also important to note the contribution this study makes to the general 
understanding of financial markets and investment behavior (Zuckerman, 1999).  From the 
study, we observe how the creation of hybrids changes the architecture of knowledge 
(Foucault, 1977).  Contrary to the dominant paradigm in financial economics (Markowitz, 
1952; Friedman, 1957; Sharpe, 1963, 1964; Gompers and Lerner, 1998), the proliferation of 
financial innovation often serves as a tool to create opacity and asymmetries of information, 
which serve as a means to evade regulation, and ultimately as a mechanism to increase the 
power/knowledge distance between those who have the privilege of membership within the 
category and those who do not.   In similar fashion, the creation of hybrid categories, 
especially within finance creates similar asymmetries of knowledge and power, resulting in 
(unintended) consequences of the ‘power’ and legitimacy that is attributed to those actors 
who have membership within the category (cf. Khan et al., 2007). Viewed from this 
sociological perspective, finance thus becomes an activity, where the goals, perceptions, 
investment decisions, and capital allocation activities of investors are acknowledged as 
endogenous, socially constructed, and shifting; therefore discounting notions of economic 
value as objective and stable (cf. Maurer et al., 2010; Berger and Luckmann, 1967, Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008; Weick, 1969), and consequently affecting investment 
decisions and practices.   
Further Research 
 
As new hybrid categories and organizational forms emerge, future research could 
illuminate our understanding of the strategies and practices managers can employ to manage 
competing identities, values and logics in new market categories. As the study suggests, 
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hybrid categories may create information and power asymmetries, making them inherently 
prone towards strategic use. This requires greater examination and thus additional exploration 
of this phenomenon could focus on the role of government and regulation. Governments are 
responsible for regulating industry to maximize long-term social benefit. However, many 
governments do not understand the approach that impact investors take and are ill-prepared to 
regulate investments that operate at the intersection of profit and public good. In one recent 
example, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, reflecting the majority opinion 
in the ruling in support of the Hobby Lobby case in 2014, wrote: “Recognizing the inherent 
compatibility between establishing a for-profit corporation and pursuing non-profit goals, 
States have increasingly adopted laws formally recognizing hybrid corporate forms”. Over 
half of the States, for instance, now recognize the ‘benefit corporation,’ a dual-purpose entity 
that seeks to achieve both a benefit for the public and a profit for its owners.” In this ruling, 
Scalia and the court found it reasonable to blur the line between non-profit and for-profit 
jurisprudence; thus, the court reasoned that a for-profit organization (Hobby Lobby) could in 
fact act like a religious non-profit organization and in so doing, exercise their religious 
objection by limiting its insurance coverage of contraception for female employees, going 
against a progressive shift in society towards greater women’s reproductive rights.26  
Future research in this area could explore the nature of government regulation in such 
markets. As other scholars have noted, cultural and political institutions vary in their 
vulnerability to challenge and change, thus the emergence of new hybrid categories may 
present an opportunity to understand ‘political opportunity’ and ‘open moments’ for policy 
and regulatory change (Kennedy et al., 2010; Gamson and Meyer, 1996). 
There remains substantial research to be conducted in understanding the emergence 
and dynamics of new hybrid categories especially in new institutional contexts. Future 
research could examine variations across different audiences and their response to new 
market categories. Scholars could develop innovative measures for a hybrid category’s 
coherence (a category’s meaning) and valence (category’s appeal), reflecting two intrinsic 
aspects of category currency (Kennedy et al., 2010) and how this shifts as the hybrid category 
matures over time. 
As we see the growing financialization (Davis, 2009) of the non-profit sector which is 
becoming increasingly ‘data-driven’ and inclined towards financial engineering and financial 
innovation to solve social problems, and the proliferation of quantitative measures of 
performance (Espeland and Sauder, 2007), it would be beneficial to understand the effect of 
market oriented values and logics in the social sector. How does it shape the cultural 
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construction and cultural toolkits appropriated for use within the category (Swidler, 1986; 
Glynn and Navis, 2013)? And to what extent do we observe increased ‘decoupling’ between 
claims made by members of the category and the actual practices performed within the 
category (e.g. Hsu and Grodal, 2015; Granqvist et al., 2013). 
By examining the emergence of impact investing and the events surrounding the Agri-
Vie investment vehicle and the activities of the New Forests Company in Uganda, the study 
revealed the potency of hybrid categories as a new form of knowledge. Ultimately, they are 
powerful political devices that serve as a bridge between disparate categories and can 
function as a mechanism to confer legitimacy, transfer knowledge across diverse audiences 
and in the worst instances, to justify unequal relations of power. 
Given the prevalence of this new organizational form and the growing interest of 
category studies as a rich research program, it remains the task of future research to discover 
the additional nuances and intricacies of this engaging and dynamic field of study. 
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FIGURE 1. 
Global FDI Flows and Social Impact Projects 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. 
Foreign Direct Investments to Africa (billion USD, current)28 
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TABLE 1. 
Investors in Agri-Vie 
 
Investor Type of Investor Investment Amount 
Sanlam Life Publicly Listed Financial 
Services Company  
Undisclosed 
W.K. Kellogg Foundation US$18.3 million 
European Investment Bank (EIB) Development Finance 
Institution 
US$12 million 
African Development Bank (AfDB) Development Finance 
Institution 
US$15 million 
Norfund Development Finance 
Institution 
US$ 8.6 million29 
International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) 
Development Finance 
Institution 
US$12.2 million30 
Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) 
Development Finance 
Institution 
Undisclosed 
Development Bank of South Africa 
(DBSA) 
Development Finance 
Institution 
US$10 million31 
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TABLE 2. 
List of Key Acronyms 
 
 
ADOA Additionality and Development 
Outcome Assessment 
  
AfDB African Development Bank 
  
AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome 
  
AVCA African Venture Capital 
Association 
  
BEE Black Economic Empowerment 
  
CAO Chief Advisor/Ombudsman 
  
CDC Commonwealth Development 
Corporation 
  
CDFI Community Development Finance 
Institution 
  
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
  
CFR Central Forest Reserve 
  
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
  
DBSA Development Bank of Southern 
Africa 
  
DFI Development Finance Institution 
  
DFID Department for International 
Development 
  
EIB European Investment Bank 
  
ESG Environmental, Social and 
Governance 
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FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
  
FSC Forest Stewardship Council 
  
GIIN Global Impact Investing Network 
  
GIIRS Global Impact Investing Rating 
System 
  
GRID Gay-related Immune Deficiency 
  
HSBC Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation 
  
IFC International Finance Corporation 
  
ILC International Land Coalition 
  
IMF International Monetary Fund 
  
IRIS Impact Reporting and Investment 
Standards 
  
LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender 
  
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army 
  
MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency 
  
NFA National Forestry Agency 
  
NFC New Forests Company 
  
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
  
SOCAP Social Capital Markets Conference 
  
SRI Socially Responsible Investing 
  
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa 
  
ULA Uganda Land Alliance 
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TABLE 3. 
Data Sources and Use in Analysis 
 
 
Data Type Quantity Original Data Source Use in Analysis 
    
Media reports & Press 
Releases 
224 Factiva, GIIN Examine media 
perceptions about 
organizational and field 
level identity 
    
Annual reports, 
development impact 
reports, brochures 
122 Impact investor 
organizations 
Investigate organizational 
claims; familiarize with 
organizational history, 
strategy, practices, 
structure, origins and 
evolution 
    
Conferences, Forums & 
Workshops 
21 Compilation of notes 
from conference 
attendance 
Examine investor and 
manager dynamics; 
triangulate investor and 
manager claims 
Private Equity in Africa; 
CSFI Impact Investing 
Round Table; Social 
Capital Markets 
Conference (SOCAP); 
Fund Manager Annual 
Investor Meeting; Policy 
Roundtable Discussions; 
Wilson Center-Forum on 
Social Entrepreneurship 
& Hybrid Value Creation 
   
    
Industry research 
reports 
187 Consulting firms, non 
profit organizations, 
foundations 
Triangulate facts and 
observations; familiarize 
with industry trends, 
market data, history, and 
origins 
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Semi-
structured/Informal 
Interviews & 
Conversations 
35 Informants Examine individual and 
organizational 
understanding of impact 
investing motivations and 
objectives; verify 
timeline of key events; 
contextualize observed 
processes 
    
Archival Interviews 27 GIIN Archives Examine individual and 
organizational 
understanding of impact 
investing motivations and 
objectives; verify 
timeline of key events; 
contextualize observed 
processes 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. 
Key Events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 2015 
2007: 
•  First Rockefeller 
Bellagio Center 
convening 
•  B Lab launched, 
creation of B 
Corps 
 
2008:  
•  Second Bellagio Center 
convening 
•  IRIS initiative launched 
•  Forced removals begin in 
Kiboga & Mubende 
communities in Uganda  
and continue until 2010 
2009: 
•  Official launch of GIIN 
Clinton Global 
Initiative 
•  ASPEN Network of 
Development 
Entrepreneurs 
launched 
2010:""
•  JP Morgan, GIIN & Rockefeller 
launch research report 
•  First GIIN Investor’s Council 
meeting 
•  Agri-Vie invests in the New 
Forests Company 
2013-2014  
•  Signed agreements 
between NFC and 
affected Ugandan 
communities from 
CAO dispute 
resolution process  
2012-2013:  
•  GIIRs launches Quality 
Analytics report 
•  Prime Minister David 
Cameron announces G8 
Social Impact Investing Task 
Force 
Uncoordinated, 
fragmented market 
activity 
Marketplace building, 
Market infrastructure 
development  
Lobbying, public policy & 
public relations 
2012  
•  Agri-Vie 
and NFC 
receive 
GIIRS Five-
Star ratings 
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FIGURE 4. 
Hybrid Categories as Political Devices 
 
 	
 
 
 
TABLE 4. 
Timeline of Key Political Actions and Outcomes 
 
Timeline Hybrid Category as a Political Device Outcome 
2004 Invoked sustainability and environmental 
impact to attract resources (i.e. political 
Granted 50 year license 
to develop timber 
Catalyzing Event 
Financial Crisis 
Forced 
Removals of 
Affected 
Communities 
Strategic Use 
of Category 
Identity 
Strategic Use 
of Category 
Membership 
Weak Institutional Setting 
Membership 
Affiliation 
Collective 
Identity 
Hybrid Category  
Knowledge Architecture 
Legitimacy, Power and  
Knowledge Transfer 
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and monetary capital) plantation in Uganda 
2006 - 2010 Engaged in identity politics, referring to 
local community as ‘illegal encroachers’; 
benefitted from a weak regulatory 
environment 
Forced removal of local 
community without 
compensation 
2010 Invoked impact investing to attract 
resources (i.e. monetary capital) 
Received investment 
capital from Agri-Vie 
and other international 
investors 
2012 Invoked impact investing 
membership/affiliation for legitimacy (i.e. 
FSC Mission to Africa, political and 
social capital) 
Forest Services Council 
(FSC) certification and 
GIIRS 5-star rating 
 
 
NOTES 																																								 																					
1 		A private U.S. based foundation founded in 1913 by John D. Rockefeller, an oil industrialist, to promote 
well-being throughout society. Today, the foundation mission is focused on building greater resilience and 
advancing more inclusive economies around the world.	
2 The primary mechanism to announce this to a wider audience was the release in November 2010 of a report 
entitled, Impact Investments: An Emerging Asset Class; this report was released in partnership by J.P.Morgan, 
the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Global Impact Investing Network. 
3 Created by B Lab, a non-profit organization that works in close association with the Global Impact Investing 
Network 
4 Email from Julian Ozanne, CEO of NFC, to Oxfam, dated 15 August 2011 cited in Grainger and Geary (2011), 
Oxfam Report 
5 As stated http://faolex.fao.org/cgi-
bin/faolex.exe?rec_id=071603&database=faolex&search_type=link&table=result&lang=eng&format_name=@
ERALL, [Accessed September 4, 2014]. 
6 Section 33 of the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act 2003, cited in Grainger and Geary (2011) Oxfam 
Report 
 
7 Email from CEO of NFC to Oxfam, dated 5 September 2011 cited in Grainger and Geary (2011) Oxfam 
Report 
 
8 A figure referenced by Kron, J. September, 21, 2011. ‘In Scramble for Land, Group Says, Company Pushed 
Ugandans Out’ http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/world/africa/in-scramble-for-land-oxfam-says-ugandans-
were-pushed-out.html, [Accessed August 30, 2014]. 
9 According to a 2011 Oxfam report by Grainger and Geary, the term ‘illegal encroachers’ was used in an email 
to Oxfam from the NFC CEO, dated 5 September 2011, cited in Grainger and Geary (2011) Oxfam Report.  
Subsequent reference to the term by NFC are based on meetings between Oxfam and the Acting Executive 
Director and the Deputy Director of the National Forests Authority and also the  IFC ‘Back to office report on 
The New Forests Company (Uganda) following an IFC Mission’, dated 16–19 March 2010, provided to Oxfam 
by NFC, refers to NFA statements on ‘encroachers’ on the land (Oxfam, 2011). 
 
10 Our informant indicated that in other countries where the legal framework is more transparent, they have 
experienced less issues. For instance, in Tanzania they paid over US$1.5 million of compensation to local 
communities for land. 
11 NFC Sustainability Report FY10: July 2009 – June 2010; in Grainger and Geary (2011) 
12 Letter from NFC to Oxfam, dated 9 September 2011; in Grainger and Geary (2011) 
 
 
44 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																													
13 Written feedback from NFC to Oxfam dated 15 September 2011. Plaintiffs claim rights to the land in the legal 
cases referred to above and these claims have not yet been determined by the courts. Oxfam has copies of the 
pleadings filed by the claimants from Mubende, as well as documents demonstrating allocation of land to war 
veterans, and has interviewed the lawyers representing the Mubende evictees. These arguments were also 
reflected in focus group discussions and individual interviews with evictees conducted by Oxfam and its partner 
organizations in July 2011; in Grainger and Geary (2011) 
14 Letter from NFC to Oxfam, dated 9 September 2011 
15 Our informant indicated that in other countries where the legal framework is more transparent, they have 
experienced less issues. For instance, in Tanzania they paid over US$1.5 million of compensation to local 
communities for land. 
16 IFC, (2011), ‘Press Release: IFC Updates Environmental and Social Standards, Strengthening Commitment to 
Sustainability and Transparency’, Washington, D.C.: IFC, 12 May 2011. 
17 For further information regarding the Equator Principles see http://www.equator-principles.com/, [Accessed 
August 29, 2014]. 
18 For more, see FSC Principles and Criteria available at, https://ic.fsc.org/principles-and-criteria.34.htm 
19 CDM Executive Board (2011), see:  Standards in Value Chains above for an explanation of Oxfam’s concerns 
relating to FSC certification of NFC, Oxfam, 2011 
20 Other companies were also on the mission, including Green Resources, Global Woods and KVTC (Kilombero 
Valley Teak Company). 
21 Uganda President Museveni gives the New Forests Company ‘Investor of the Year’ award’, 18 January 2008, 
www.forests.com/news, in Grainger and Geary (2011). 
22  The GIIRS audit process has apparently been used in assessing the social and environmental impact and 
practices of companies and funds using a methodology that has now been used by over 6,000 companies. 
23 According to the NFC website, http://www.newforests.net/index.php/hmd_article/the-new-forests-company-
receives-5-star-rating-on-the-giirs   [Accessed August 30, 2014]. 
24 As promoted on the Agri-Vie website and promotional materials, http://agrivie.com/, [Accessed: August 30, 
2014]. 
25 In December 2011, affected community representatives, with the support of Oxfam International, Oxfam 
Great Britain, and the Uganda Land Alliance (ULA), submitted a complaint to the Office of the Compliance 
Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), the independent recourse mechanism for the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank Group, on behalf of 
community members affected by the New Forests Company’s Namwasa plantation in Mubende District and 
Luwunga Plantation which straddles the Kiboga and Kyankwanzi Districts in Uganda.  In the terms of the 
Agreement, the parties will launch a joint program of sustainable development aimed at benefiting the affected 
community.  According to the CAO, the details of the Agreement are to remain confidential to the parties and 
their advisors. For more, see: CAO, Agreement between Mubende Community and New Forests Company in 
Uganda sees Community Resettled on New Land, (May 6, 2014; www.cao-ombudsman.org), [Accessed August 
30, 2014]. 
26 This reflects an on going debate about the interpretation and unintended implications of B Corporations,  
Morey, M. (2014), The Rockefeller Foundation’s Hand in Hobby Lobby, Stanford Social Innovation Review,	
http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/the_rockefeller_foundations_hand_in_hobby_lobby?utm_source=Enews&
utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=SSIR_Now&utm_content=Title, [Accessed September 5, 2014]. 
27 Simon, J. and Barmeier, J. (2010), More than Money: Impact Investing for Development., The Center for 
Global Development. 
28 UNCTAD WIR; IMF World Economic Outlook; African Economic Outlook 
29 Approximate conversion figure, the investment was for 54.7 million Norwegian Krone (MNOK) 
30 IFC’s equity investment of $12.2 million was for an 11.5 per cent stake. According to IFC’s procedures the 
project is categorized as environmental category FI (financial institution), 
http://ifcext.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/projectdisplay/spi_dp27674 [Accessed August 30, 2014]. 
 
31 Approximate conversion figure, in 2008, the investment was for 100 million rands (ZAR) 
